JEWISH MONOTHEISM AS THE MATRIX FOR NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGY: A REVIEW ARTICLE

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A recent slim volume by Larry Hurtado\(^1\) attempts to do what many larger ones have hardly dared: to explain the genesis of New Testament christology. It is the fruit of at least a decade of research and reflection.\(^2\) Aspiring to supersede Wilhelm Bousset's outdated but oft-quoted treatments of Judaism\(^3\) and the evolution of NT christology in its Hellenistic setting,\(^4\) Hurtado adopts the task and methods of the History of Religions school, only to modify, correct, or even reverse many of Bousset's results. Essentially he concludes that the earliest Jewish Christians worshipped the risen Jesus, on the basis of their experiences of him, well before Christianity became a predominantly Gentile religion, and they were able to reconcile this practice with their inherited faith in one God by construing Jesus' exaltation in terms of what Hurtado calls the concept of divine agency which was widely accepted in pre-Christian Judaism.

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This is Hurtado's answer to the problem he poses for the investigation: "How did the early Christians accommodate the veneration of the exalted Jesus alongside God while continuing to see themselves as loyal to the fundamental emphasis of their ancestral tradition on one God?" (p. 2). Bousset did not have this problem, for in his view strict Jewish monotheism had already been weakened by the undercurrents of angelology, dualism, and speculations about hypostases (Religion des Judentums) before the flood of pagan converts to Christianity accelerated the process by producing the Jesus cult and duplicating the object of faith (Kyrios Christos). Building on recent work by J.A. Fitzmyer and M. Hengel, among others, Hurtado holds that the cultic veneration of Jesus began earlier than Bousset allowed, indeed in the earliest Palestinian community, as shown by the μαρανάθα-prayer (note pp. 4, 106-07). Therefore Hurtado accounts for the rise of the Jesus-cult by recourse to Jewish rather than Hellenistic prototypes (pp. 3-7).

As for method, Hurtado admits his debt to the History of Religions school. He situates early Christianity in its Graeco-Roman-Jewish context and affirms the need to study practices as well as beliefs. On the other hand, he says, some features of Christianity were unique and not derived from the religious environment. He highlights the bourgeois German liberalism of scholars such as Bousset as one factor which might have made them "uncomfortable" with "the traditional view of Jesus as divine" (p. 10). Hurtado's is therefore a duly modified religionsgeschichtliche Methode (pp. 9-11).

Hurtado regards Bousset's picture of ancient Jewish monotheism as naïve, both in its assumption that the Jews once had a simplistic concept of one God unqualified by other agencies (pp. 7-9), and in its inference that the swell of such agents in the Second Temple period amounted therefore to a threat or a compromise (chapters 1-4). The actual state of affairs was between these extremes. There was a well-worn and broadly based belief among Jews that God had

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a chief agent, whether a personification of a divine attribute (λόγος, σοφία), a glorified patriarch (Enoch, Moses), or a principal angel (Michael, Jahoel, Melchizedek) (p. 17 and chapters 1-4 passim). Yet even where the language used to describe these figures waxed most honorific—sometimes involving isolated titles or functions of deity (esp. Philo)—the monotheism of the writers, expressed elsewhere in their writings, remained firm and intact. In the ongoing debate about the nature of hypostases, Hurtado sides with Jewish and Anglo-American scholars (R. Marcus, J.D.G. Dunn, A. Gibson) against the Continental tendency to descry in them semi-independent divine beings (W. Bouisset, H. Ringgren, J. Fossum). In spite of some vivid modes of speech found in ancient Jewish writings, God’s Word, Wisdom, etc. denoted only God himself working in the world (chapter 2). The deification of a human being by a Jewish author looks most probable in passages where Philo idealizes Moses. Hurtado follows C.R. Holladay (against, inter alia, E.R. Goodenough, P.W. van der Horst) in interpreting Philo’s extravagant claims for Moses in the light of his apologetic aim to produce a Jewish rival to Hellenistic divine men. Such statements were in no way contrary to Philo’s strenuous monotheism (chapter 3). Nor did growing Jewish interest in God’s chief angel result in a hypostatic bifurcation between God’s glory and his personal being (pace C. Rowland, J. Fossum). This angelic entity too remained “essentially distinct from God” (p. 86). Again and again Hurtado applies an acid test to claims that Jewish monotheism was under strain: Is there evidence of practical Jewish cults directed to the worship of such figures? Hurtado cannot find a trace.

Jewish language about a divine agent under the one God provided the conceptual schema into which the early Palestinian church integrated its experiences of the historical Jesus and resurrected Christ (chapter 5). The major step was to identify Jesus with God’s principal helper. Honorific titles (e.g., χώρος) and other motifs (e.g., protological and eschatological functions) flowed into the developing christology afterwards (pp. 93-99). But the Jewish concept of divine agency cannot account for all features of early christology. The church sang hymns to Christ, prayed to him, used his name in baptisms, fellowshipped with him at table, created confessions of faith in him, and received prophetic revelations from him. Cultic practices of this sort are totally unparallelled in the Jewish divine agency tradition, and must have arisen directly out
of experiences of Jesus. Nevertheless, the people who did these things were Jewish monotheists who, like other Jews who assumed divine agency, had no intention of departing from the faith of their fathers. Hence the christology of the early church, while indebted to the Jewish divine agency stream for its conceptual origins, entailed a binitarian mutation in Jewish monotheism. Thus arose faith in Jesus Christ beside and within faith in God.

Evaluation

One God, One Lord advances christological discussion beyond Kyrios Christos in several respects. The χριστός-cry was the Achilles’ heel of Bousset’s construction, as shown by his pleading attempts to evade the force of this evidence for the cultic veneration of Jesus in the earliest Palestinian community (discussed by Hurtado on pp. 131-32, note 11). In the renewed religio-historical enterprise of the latter half of the twentieth century, Hellenized Judaism has replaced pagan Hellenism as the matrix in which to seek the birth of Christianity. Refined methods demand a fresh look at many aspects of Bousset’s presentation of Judaism. Yet Bousset’s bold project—to trace historically the rise of faith in Jesus Christ in the church—was a noble vision and promised gains both for the humanities and for Christian faith itself. A merit of Hurtado’s work is the way in which it embraces Bousset’s task while supplying a programme for pursuing it under the guidance of purged methods.

Hurtado has identified what must have been one of the first and most fundamental theological issues for the early Jewish Christian church: the relationship of a high christology to traditional monotheism. Although Judaism in the first century C.E. was more of an orthopraxy than an orthodoxy and lacked either creed or council, we have evidence from a number of quarters that monotheism was a primary and deeply held tenet. The decree of Antiochus Epiphanes (167 B.C.E.) had forced the Jews of Palestine to take a stand vis-à-vis Greek polytheism and idolatry (1 Macc. 1:41-64). The belief in one God became a keynote of the Jewish mission to the Gentiles, as attested by its importance in Jewish

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propaganda literature⁷ and its recognition by pagan writers as a mark of Jews.⁸ The Shema was the nearest equivalent in Judaism to a confession of faith. Its use for catechism or liturgy in some circles dates back at least to the second century B.C.⁹ Such a practice left traces at Qumran in the first century C.E.¹⁰ The opening tractate of the Mishnah prescribes rules for the daily morning and evening recitation of the Shema in a passage containing phrases from the period when the Temple was still standing (Berakoth chapters 1-2), and the prominent place of Deut. 6:4-6 at the beginning of the

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¹⁰ F.E. Vokes finds behind 1QS 10:10 an ordinance that the Shema be said twice a day, and discusses a phylactery from cave 8 which has the Shema written in a rectangle surrounded by other passages. “Creeds in the New Testament,” in Studia Evangelica, Volume IV, ed. Elizabeth E. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen 112, 580-88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973).
synagogue liturgy may well be as old. At least four ancient Jewish sources expressly state that monotheism, or the *Shema*, or the first commandment of the Decalogue, is the "first" item in the Jewish way of life. Given the primacy accorded to monotheism among Jews, we must recognize that the Jewish Christians who worshipped Jesus were modifying their religion at its central point. They must have reflected on what they were doing from the beginning. Hurtado has therefore fastened upon a crucial dynamic behind the shaping of christology.

His emphasis throughout on the integrity of monotheism among Jews who ascribed divine titles or functions to other beings on occasion is a healthy corrective to Bousset’s influence. It is difficult if not impossible to demonstrate that there was any widespread Jewish movement toward cults other than that of the one God. Hurtato’s attempted refutation of the idea that some Jews worshipped angels (pp. 28-35) is not altogether convincing, and he may have overlooked *Pseudo-Philo* 13.6, but surely such worship of angels as there might have been was a declension from a socially shared ideal. This conclusion, based on the criterion of cultic practices, is corroborated by another recent study from a theological angle. Although pagans applied εἰς- or μόνος-formulae to multiple gods and goddesses in a merely elative sense, Jews never applied this type of formula to their intermediaries, but reserved them very stringently for God alone. The firmness of Jewish monotheism makes it all the more remarkable that Jewish Christians could not only acclaim Jesus cultically in terms originally intended for God but could also predicate εἰς and μόνος-formulae of him.

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13 Note the transfer of Isa. 45:23, taken from the exclusively monotheistic context of vv. 21-24, to Jesus in the prediction of Phil. 2:9-11; contrast the original reference preserved in Rom. 14:11.
14 Matt. 23:8-10; 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:4-6; Jude 4; Odes of Solomon 41.13-15. For the use of such formulae in paganism, the OT, Judaism, and early Christianity, see Erik Adolf G. Peterson, *ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ: Epigraphische, formgeschichtliche und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Neue Folge 24 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926); Gerhard Delling, "ΜΟΝΟΣ ΘΕΟΣ," in *Studien zum Neuen Testament und zum hellenistischen Judentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze 1950-1968*, ed. Ferdinand Hahn, Traugott Holz, and Nikolaus Walter, 391-400 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970); Ferdinand Hahn, "The Confession of the One
Hurtado’s assertion that this basic step was, in Gestalt-fashion, the historical and theological axiom for, rather than the final crystallization of, the heaping of individual divine titles, actions, and traits upon Christ through the first century (pp. 13, 93) is intriguing but not yet proved. In its favour one might urge that: (1) the very primacy of monotheism in Judaism would have required attention to the problem of monotheism and christology as soon as Jesus was conceived in terms of deity, which was certainly within the “tunnel period” prior to Paul’s writings, and (2) our earliest datable evidence for the use of monotheistic language as a christological category (1 Cor. 8:6; Phil. 2:9-11) pre-dates our best data for either a Wisdom- or a Logos-christology (Col. 1:15-17; Heb. 1:1-3; John 1:1-3). Perhaps interdisciplinary work spanning NT studies and the psychology or sociology of knowledge could offer some helpful perspectives on Hurtado’s suggestion. In any case, his call for a comprehensive synthesis is refreshing after several decades of atomizing studies in NT christology.

A number of questions cluster about Hurtado’s concept of divine agency in Judaism. First, is it accurate to compare personified divine attributes with exalted patriarchs and angels? The fact that in some Jewish minds Enoch could become “like one of the glorious ones” (2 Enoch 22.6-10) blurs the boundary between the latter two categories, but is there a similar fluidity between these and the first? Hartmut Gese thinks so,15 but he operates with the assumption that Wisdom was an hypostasis. On Hurtado’s view, the so-called hypostases boil down to colourful word-pictures referring to God himself as involved in the world. At the level of phraseology they draw from descriptions of divine agents, but only in a metaphorical way (pp. 41, 49-50). Conceptually there was in the ancient Jewish mind a line between these personifications and the other, actually personal beings, which line corresponded to the infinite qualitative difference between the Creator and creation. To posit “divine agency” as a bland, general taxon unifying both classes may be

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more confusing than illuminating. Hurtado needs to demonstrate that ancient Jews themselves knew such an abstraction, at least in the substratum of consciousness, before he can use it as a single model to explain the emergence of christology.

Second, how central a role did personified attributes and divine agents play in Jewish religion and theology of the Second Temple period? Hurtado states, "Interest in the role of these divine agents was apparently widespread" (p. 8), and proceeds to spend four of his five numbered chapters discussing them in preparation for his final chapter on the Christian mutation in monotheism. The reader gets the impression that Judaism had an important and well-defined category of divine agency which found its fulfillment or embodiment in Jesus. One wonders whether Hurtado has assimilated the significant conclusion of Gerhard Pfeifer, based on a survey of 106 ancient Jewish sources: "The items referred to as hypostases seem to have played no important role in Jewish theology of that period." 16

A related problem is the methodological question of which sources are to be used in reconstructing ancient Judaism. Which ones, if any, are representative? Hurtado has not moved beyond Bousset in the matter of dependence mainly on apocryphal and pseudepigraphical Jewish writings (six columns of references in Hurtado's index of ancient authors) and Philo (two columns), with minimal references to the Septuagint, Targums, or rabbinic sources (half a column together). G.F. Moore tried to rectify matters and came under just criticism for his almost exclusive reliance on the latter in a study of so-called normative Judaism. 17 True, historians now rightly emphasize the plurality of Judaism before the reorganization at Jabneh. Moreover, Jacob Neusner's use of critical methods for the study of the Mishnah and related books has made the issues of attribution and dating of sayings in these later sources problematic for non-specialists. 18 Nevertheless, the tradi-

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16 I quote from Hurtado's paraphrase of this conclusion on p. 36; see also Hurtado's p. 143, note 74. For the original statement, see Gerhard Pfeifer, Ursprung und Wesen der Hypostasenvorstellungen im Judentum, Arbeiten zur Theologie, Reihe I, 31 (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1967), 66, 102.


tional Jewish writings of the first several centuries C.E. undoubtedly contain old and weighty material, and anyone studying Judaism in the first century C.E. neglects rabbinics at great risk. 19 If the importance and role of intermediaries is less than fully clear in those writings which the Jews did not preserve for themselves, what would happen to our reconstruction if we were to include those traditions which they did pass down to later generations?

The third, and most serious, problem with Hurtado’s notion of divine agency has to do with the way he employs it to explain how the early Jewish Christians reckoned with the issue of monotheism and christology. Throughout chapters one to four he takes great pains to show that the concept of divine agency in Judaism did not modify monotheism. On the one hand, the personification of divine attributes fell short of producing hypostases; on the other, exalted patriarchs and principal angels remained distinct from, and subordinate to, God. Jewish writers were careful to maintain the conceptual gulf between God and the world. Above all, Jews did not worship any of these figures. How then, we must ask, could divine agency have helped Jewish Christians to solve the precise problem stated at the beginning of Hurtado’s book: to make sense of the cultic veneration of Jesus beside God? If Jesus for them was an aspect of the Divine, parallel to Philo’s Word or Wisdom, there was no mutation in their monotheism. If he became for them a glorified hero like Enoch or Moses, or indeed if they thought he was transformed into a principal angel, would not their monotheistic instinct have prevented their worshipping him, even as it precluded their venerating other similar figures? In short, if belief in divine agency did not affect Jewish monotheism, how can it explain the mutation in Christian monotheism?

Hurtado’s appeal to the early church’s experiences of Jesus does not supply what is lacking in his divine agency hypothesis. He states, “Such experiences were not the simple products of prior christological convictions but were often the generative cause of christological convictions” (p. 120). But this is backwards. Human beings interpret their experiences by fusing them with transcenden-

tal schemata which they bring to bear on perception. Complex schemata may be socially based and learned, and often serve to rule out socially unacceptable interpretations of raw data. For Jews of the first century, monotheism was presupposed and formed part of such a hermeneutical grid. A vision of radiant light, like Paul had (pp. 118-19), would be ambiguous in itself. A Jewish monotheist might understand it as an epiphany of the one God, worthy of worship; or it might be an angel or a saint in glory. The schema outlined by Hurtado—faith in one God supplemented by a subordinate divine agent—would enable a Jew to construe a vision of Christ in either way, but it cannot account for the complication of faith in one God itself which actually came about and was later expressed by the Fathers of the church in terms of hypostases. We have to look elsewhere to explain the mutation in monotheism.

Bousset's theory of the dawning of a divine χωρος-christology among Gentiles in the church who had been only partly converted from Hellenistic polytheism was inaccurate historically, but at least

20 "Perception is determined by schemata somewhat in the same sense that the observable properties of organisms are determined by their genes: it results from the interaction of schema and available information." "Perception of meaning, like the perception of other aspects of the environment, depends on schematic control of information pickup." Ulrich Neisser, Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976), 56, 72.

21 Hurtado adopts uncritically S. Kim's conclusion that Paul's vision of Christ persuaded him of Jesus' divine Sonship then and there: "Something about the vision itself apparently communicated Christ's honorific status as God's Son" (p. 118). See Seyoon Kim, The Origin of Paul's Gospel (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1981; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982). This is by no means obvious. The vision would have required Paul to deduce no more than that Jesus stood in God's favour. This alone would have provoked Paul to think through again his view of Jesus, and it may have been in the process of reflecting on the christological claims of the early Christians that Paul concluded that they were correct, perhaps not without a struggle. See now the critique of Kim's thesis in James D.G. Dunn, "'A Light to the Gentiles': the Significance of the Damascus Road Christophany for Paul," in The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird, ed. L.D. Hurst and N.T. Wright, 251-66 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), esp. 256-62. Even if Paul did arrive at a high sonship christology as a result of the vision, that could only have been because he had gained prior exposure to the Christian estimate of Jesus Christ while he was a persecutor of the church. Kim is more restrained that Hurtado: "Paul also saw confirmed at the Christophany the primitive church's confession of Jesus as the Son of God" (Kim, Origin, 331, italics mine). This, of course, leaves unexplained the emergence of that confession in the first place.
it might have explained the divine status accorded to Jesus by the writers of the NT.

Hurtado can maintain his hypothesis if he can identify some particular strand within wider Jewish thought about divine agency which focused on a figure clearly distinct from God (unlike personifications) and stretched the boundaries of monotheism so as to cast around that figure an aureola of deity (unlike patriarchal or angelic agents). A schema which meets both criteria, catalyzed by the resurrection appearances, could explain the Jesus-phenomenon. Given Hurtado’s findings about the integrity of Jewish monotheism in our period, it is doubtful whether Jewish Christians would have differentiated themselves from all other Jewish groups by producing so radically novel a form of monotheism apart from the supreme authority of their master. Moreover, even his personal claims would not have carried conviction unless they were plausibly argued from scripture, the foundation of Judaism. The only place where the sort of schema just outlined can be found is the one class of intermediaries which Hurtado does not identify as such: eschatological figures in the Bible.22

A number of prophetic scriptures were bones of contention between the church and the synagogue during the early centuries. Paramount among them were Psalm 110:1 and Daniel 7:13. Both speak of an apparently human Israelite king in terms of deity. “The original sense of [Psalm] 110.1 was evidently that a particular Israelite monarch reigned with the power and authority of Yahweh himself.”23 The “one like a son of man” of Daniel 7:13 is related to the whole nation of Israel in 7:22, 27, but this collective dimension should no more be pitted against the singular linguistic forms elsewhere than the collective interpretation of the beasts as “kingdoms” in 7:23-24 should be pitted against the explicit

22 Hurtado does discuss several eschatological figures, but he classifies them either as exalted patriarchs (e.g., Enoch) or as principal angels (e.g., Melchizedek). What makes a separate category appropriate, however, is the fact that Hurtado’s test of cultic veneration is not applicable to eschatological beings. No one would offer worship to a person who is still awaited in the future. But a person who meets the two criteria just specified might well receive divine honours from followers who have become convinced of his arrival.

"kings" of 7:17. Subsequent Jewish writers in antiquity, in any case, understood an individual person here. His reception of universal and eternal rule over the creation indicates his share in a uniquely divine prerogative (Dan. 7:14, 27). Both Psalm 110:1 and Daniel 7:13 were interpreted messianically in Judaism. Both passages became foci for special comments by the rabbis in polemical dialogue with Christians, the former being referred sometimes to the Messiah and sometimes to Abraham, and the latter, significantly, being discussed in the controversy over "two powers in heaven". Both texts are quoted or alluded to in a broad range of NT strata. According to Matthew 26:64 (parallel Mark 14:62), Jesus brought the two texts together in reference to himself at his trial, thus inviting his sentence on the ground of blasphemy. If criticism could establish some probability that the Gospels are historically reliable on this point, at least in the sense that Jesus had

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24 RSV obscures the singular suffixes in the latter half of Dan. 7:27 (πρὸς αὐτοῦ) by its interpretative translation "their". In an influential treatment of Daniel 7, P.M. Casey defends a corporate understanding of the "one like a son of man" against an individual one (Son of Man: The interpretation and influence of Daniel 7 [London: S.P.C.K., 1979], 24-40). But he gives due consideration neither to the linguistic features just mentioned, nor to the fact that individual and corporate elements might both be present, for the king of Israel was a representative figure (e.g., 2 Samuel 24).


26 For Psa. 110, note the translation of v. 3c in the LXX (109:3c): ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸς τωσσόρου ἡγεμόνα σου, which seems to allude to Psa: 2:7c ἐκ τοῦ σμίου γεννημα σου. The latter was understood messianically at Qumran (1QSa 2:11-12, in the light of 4QFlor 1:18-19). For Dan. 7:13, see 1 Enoch 37-71 passim, and the allusions in 4 Ezra 13, which Jewish works, even if from the Christian era, appear to be untouched by Christian influence (David Winston Suter, "Weighted in the Balance: The Similitudes of Enoch in Recent Discussion," Religious Studies Review 7 [1981]: 217-21). The interpenetration of the Messiah concept and Daniel’s "one like a son of man" in pre-christian Judaism is delineated in William Horbury, "The Messianic Associations of ‘The Son of Man’," Journal of Theological Studies, new series 36 (1985): 34-55.

27 On the rabbinc handling of Psa. 110, see Hay, 27-33. For the Two Powers controversy, including discussion of Dan. 7:9 f., see A.F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinc Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 25 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), esp. 149.

used both passages prior to the trial, Hurtado would have what he needs to frame a viable hypothesis about the origins of christology. That is, if it could be shown that Jesus interpreted the authoritative Jewish scriptures in such a way as to convince his followers that he as the Messiah would participate in the incomparable status of the one God, it would in turn become possible to explain how the earliest Jewish Christians came to accept a mutation in their monotheism itself. But to provide scientific grounding for a theory of this sort is a formidable task.29

To sum up: Hurtado’s critique of Bousset is cogent, but his positive construction is still too much under Bousset’s shadow. Although his argument needs to be honed further, his four chapters on divine agency highlight features of Jewish language about intermediaries which undoubtedly influenced the church’s christology in ways other than effecting the modification of monotheism. In this respect his work stands beside that of James Dunn.30

The matters which remain to be noted are minor. If the adjective “trinitarian” implies community of substantia or essentia among divine persons, and therefore more precisely describes the doctrine of the Fathers than that of the NT authors, might we find a better


term than "binitarian devotion" (p. 2 and passim) for the early period (perhaps "binary")? Within the monotheistic tradition, the contrary of "binitarian" is not "monotheistic" (p. 3), but "unitarian". Finally, errata may be found on p. 9, l. 4 from top ("origin" for "origins"); p. 42, l. 4 from bottom ("mediation" for "meditation"); p. 110, l. 14 from top ("accounted" for "recounted").