Kevin Giles’s
The Trinity and Subordinationism:
A Review Article

Peter R. Schemm, Jr.
Assistant Professor of Theology,
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
Wake Forest, North Carolina

Introduction

Recently Thomas R. Schreiner, a respected complementarian scholar, made this comment about the proliferation of books written by egalitarian authors:

Sometimes I wonder if egalitarians hope to triumph in the debate on the role of women by publishing book after book on the subject. Each work propounds a new thesis that explains why the traditional interpretation is flawed. Complementarians could easily give in from sheer exhaustion, thinking that so many books written by such a diversity of authors could scarcely be wrong.2

Schreiner goes on to ask, “Is the goal of publishing to write what is true or what is new?”3 This is a crucial question and one that this article bears in mind in reviewing Kevin Giles’s recent work, The Trinity and Subordinationism.

The first half of this review article examines Giles’s thesis and theological method, then surveys the content of the book’s three parts: “the Trinity tradition,” “the woman tradition,” and “the slavery tradition.” The second half evaluates Giles’s understanding of the issue, his thesis and method, his usage of terms and trinitarian concepts, his representation of a few key theologians, and his trinitarian model for gender relations.

Content of the Book

Purpose and Thesis

Giles’s primary purpose in writing The Trinity and Subordinationism is to explain the orthodox view of the doctrine of the Trinity and then show its significance for male-female relations. The thesis of his work is built largely around the rejection of what some believe to be a legitimate expression of the doctrine of the Trinity, the concept of the eternal subordination of the Son to the Father. Specifically, Giles’s thesis may be put this way: tradition plays a formative role in the development of three critical theological issues each related to the concept of subordination and each developing in a unique cultural context (6-8). Arguing that tradition is on his side, the author claims that orthodox expressions of the Trinity reject every form of the eternal subordination of the Son. To ignore theological tradition in this case is to step out of the boundaries of orthodoxy. The opposite is the case with regard to the issues of gender and slavery. The traditional views of male-female relations and slavery ought to be rejected. Proposing a “contextual evangelical hermeneutic” (249), Giles suggests that the reason one should affirm a nontraditional view of gender relations and slavery is that cultural values have changed and with that change has come a fresh reading of the text on these issues.

Theological Method

Giles introduces his work by explaining the importance of theological method as it relates to the doctrine of the Trinity.
He says that in his research he “discovered that the debate about the Trinity was in essence a debate about theological method, something right at the forefront of evangelical thinking today” (2). By theological method, Giles means the approach one takes in order to settle difficult theological questions that are not directly answered in Scripture. Both the relations within the Trinity and the relations between men and women illustrate the same type of methodological problem. These are complex theological disputes that Scripture does not anticipate. Further, it will not do to simply quote biblical texts and give one’s interpretation of them. As it was in the fourth century trinitarian debates, so it is today—simply quoting texts will inevitably lead to a “textjam” (3).

Citing Athanasius, Giles suggests that the Bible is to be read theologically rather than as a string of proof-texts. Arius made the methodological mistake of simply quoting texts in order to support his views. However, reading the Bible theologically means one grasps the “scope” of Scripture—“the overall drift of the Bible, its primary focus, its theological center” (3). This scope of Scripture is not something an individual comes up with on his own. Rather, it agrees with the tradition of the fathers. Evangelicals who suggest that “all theology springs immediately from the Bible” deny the significance of the role of tradition as a theological source and in so doing “they set themselves outside of the orthodoxy the creeds and the Reformation confessions define and put themselves at odds with most other Christians, past and present” (6).

Giles further develops his method by explaining the relationship between theology and culture. He says that his book “is predicated on the view that the Bible can often be read in more than one way, even on important matters” (8-9). Though this statement is controversial, he believes it is undeniable since history gives innumerable examples of learned theologians who have differed in their understanding of almost every imaginable doctrine. According to Giles, this means that cultural context is part of the exegetical outcome. The cultural context is not that of the author of Scripture but rather that of the interpreter of Scripture. Modern interpreters with new scientific data see the inadequacies of old interpretations that argued, for example, that the sun revolved around the earth or that creation happened in six “literal” days (9). Interpreters with new information in different cultural settings discover different readings of Scripture. And though they are different, they are nevertheless equally valid readings since the new readings are due to a changed understanding of the world that God himself has brought to pass.

This hermeneutical rule, that cultural context contributes to the exegetical outcome, is said to be illustrated in the Bible’s teaching on women and slavery. Slavery and the oppression of women both came to be seen as unjust. Reading the Bible, then, in an emancipated context requires the rejection of the traditional reading. Thus, “the change in culture led to a change in interpretation” (10). Many evangelicals will not approve of this hermeneutical rule because they have been taught that there is only one proper interpretation of any given passage of Scripture. This typical response, however, has been challenged by modern hermeneutical theory. It is now recognized, Giles continues, that texts are not self-interpreting and every human interpreter comes to the text with theological and cultural presuppositions. Therefore, more than one interpretation is possible. Giles summarizes his hermeneutical rule this way: “Context contributes to meaning” (11). In sum, the Bible is not to be understood as a book of timeless, transcultural propositions. Rather, it is “a Spirit-book that can speak for God in different contexts when things of necessity are seen in a different way” (11).

Part One: The Trinity Tradition: Affirmed by All but Actually Rejected by Some

In the first chapter, “Conservative Evangelicals Head Off on Their Own,” Giles begins with what he believes to be the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity expressed in the contemporary discussion. The three persons of the Godhead are reciprocally related. None of the persons is “before or after another . . . none is subordinated in being or function to another” (21). Several theologians are said to support this claim (David Cunningham, Millard Erickson, Wayne House, and Ted Peters), while many conservative evangelicals wrongly suggest the idea of the eternal subordination of the Son to the Father (H. Scott Baldwin, John V. Dahms, Wayne Grudem, George W. Knight, Andreas J. Köstenberger, Stephen D. Kovach, Robert Letham, William D. Mounce, Werner Neuer, John Piper, Thomas R. Schreiner, and Peter R. Schemm). The latter group, says Giles, attempts to make a case for the “permanent subordination of women” (23) based on the eternal subordination of the Son. The intra-trinitarian relations are used as a rationale for how equality in being/essence and subordination can be endorsed without contradiction.

Giles devotes his second chapter to the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity. Athanasius is the most important contributor to the early development of that doctrine because he, unlike Arius, properly understood the entire scope of the Bible. Athanasius argues from two theological presuppositions: “the eternal oneness of being of the Father and the Son and the temporal subordination of the Son in becoming man” (35). Thus, according to Giles, Athanasius rejects any possibility of an eternal subordination of the Son. The Cappadocians likewise wanted to exclude subordinationism though they were not completely successful in their doctrinal expressions. They were wrongly wedded to the concept of the Father as the one source or origin of the Godhead (43). Also in opposition to Arianism, the Creed of Nicea set forth the significance of the oneness of the Father and...
Son. It categorically endorsed the equality of the Father and Son and the temporal subordination (only) of the Son for the purpose of salvation.

John Calvin’s understanding of trinitarian doctrine is also surveyed. Calvin begins his treatise on the Trinity in the Institutes by explaining what “the three” ought to be called (53). He suggests that the term person be understood as a subsistence in God’s essence. Though Calvin does not explain exactly what this differentiating subsistence is, he is clear that the three subsistences share equally in the divine being or essence of God. From this Giles concludes, “the word subsistence for Calvin, rather than implying the subordination of the Son or the Spirit to the Father, excludes this very idea” (54).

Chapter three, “Subordinating Tradition,” outlines seven categories of subordinationism, five of which Giles finds in evangelical literature today (derivative subordinationism, numerical subordinationism, nineteenth- and twentieth-century ontological subordinationism, operational subordinationism, eternal role subordinationism). Derivative subordinationism views the deity of the Son and the Spirit as that which is derived from the Father. Giles says, “because the primary idea is that derivation of being implies diminution of being and authority, I call this error ‘derivative subordinationism’” (65). The work of Dahms, Kovach and Schemm, and the 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report are each examples of derivative subordinationism. Kovach and Schemm are also used as examples of numerical subordinationism, as Giles puts it, which sees the members of the Trinity in an order of authority or hierarchical ranking (69).

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century ontological subordinationism is most notably expressed in the work of Princeton theologian Charles Hodge. Giles views Hodge’s proposal as making the Father ontologically superior to the Son and Spirit. Thus, says Giles, the “divine being (essence) flows downward from the Father in diminishing measure. For this reason the Son is subordinated ontologically and functionally to the Father” (73). In contemporary evangelical literatureKnight is a widely recognized hierarchicalist who asserts this view while Dahms is one of the most explicit representatives among contemporary proposals. Letham, Kovach and Schemm, D. B. Knox, Robert Doyle, and Tony Payne are each said to affirm ontological subordinationism. The 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report, however, is “the most detailed presentation of the case that the Son is eternally subordinate to the Father in being and role” (78).

Giles last category of subordinationism is eternal role subordinationism. Wayne Grudem is cited as the most detailed expression of this view. This approach differs from nineteenth-century arguments for operational subordinationism by asserting functional or role subordination “without subordination of being” (83). The concept of role subordination is a new concept. “No one ever spoke of the subordination in role of the Son (or of women) prior to the mid 1970s” (83). Giles suggests that this new way of speaking of the Trinity has several implications, none of which, he says, find their basis in historical orthodoxy.

In the fourth chapter, “The Retrieval and Refinement of the Nicene Trinitarian Tradition in the Twentieth Century,” Giles asserts that most evangelicals who argue for the eternal subordination of the Son seem to be “oblivious” not only to the retrieval of trinitarian doctrine but also to the significant trend among those formidable trinitarian theologians responsible for initiating the renewal—namely, Karl Barth and Karl Rahner (87). Barth, Rahner, Thomas F. Torrance, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Vladimir Lossky, John D. Zizioulas, and Erickson are each examples of the undisputed trend to retrieve and refine Nicene orthodoxy. In Giles words, “the goal has been to eradicate any implications in the primitive tradition that could detract from the full equality and unity of the three distinct persons of the Trinity” (87). As the rest of the chapter makes clear, Giles suggests that none of these trinitarian theologians affirms the eternal subordination of the Son to the Father in any sense.

The final chapter of part one argues that conservative evangelicals who teach the eternal subordination of the Son are a small minority “sitting out on the end of a very thin branch” (106). Trinitarian tradition is not on their side as they suggest. Summarizing his findings Giles says, “evangelicals who claim that their doctrine of the eternal subordination of the Son is historical orthodoxy show both an ignorance of what the great theologians of the past and the creeds and confessions actually teach and an ignorance of the recognized inadequacies of many expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity from the time of the Reformation to the 1960s” (108). The root cause of the error of those affirming the subordination of the Son is their starting point, the equal yet different model of male-female relations. They work from fallen human relations back to divine relations and in so doing commit the very error that Barth warned against. Instead of moving from divine relations to human relations by analogy, they move in the opposite direction. In virtually every element of a hierarchical presentation of trinitarian theology, the determining factor is not the Bible properly understood throughout church history but an all-consuming drive for male headship (115).

Part Two: The Woman Tradition: Reinterpreted by Some, Rejected by Others

In part two, Giles claims that all evangelicals have changed their theology of the sexes based on the profound cultural pressure of the post 1970s women’s movement. The new cultural context has required a new reading of the Bible and evangelicals on both sides of the gender issue have done so either wittingly or unwittingly. Like the debate over the doctrine of the Trinity, the contribution of tradition as a
theological source is very important (142). Those who argue for “the permanent subordination of women” insist on calling their view the “historic” or “traditional” view when in fact, according to Giles, they actually break with tradition and have a “novel” view (143). This is yet another justification for Giles’s hermeneutical rule that “a change in culture often leads to a change in the interpretation of the Bible” (145).

In order to make his case, Giles first surveys women in the Christian tradition. Chapter six, “Women in the Modern World and in Christian Tradition,” covers some of the great exegesis of church history who have interpreted the Bible’s teaching on women. John Chrysostom, Martin Luther, John Calvin, John Knox, Matthew Henry, Jonathan Edwards, and Charles Hodge all fit the category of those who teach that “God has made women as a race or class inferior to men, excluding them from leadership in the home, the church and the world” (146). Commenting on Gen 1:27 and 1 Cor 11:7, Augustine and Aquinas fit the category of those who claim that women do not equally bear the image of God. Irenaeus and Tertullian are both examples of those who teach that women are more prone to sin and deception based on Gen 3 and 1 Tim 2:14. For the past nineteen centuries the history of interpretation has uniformly argued for the subordination and inferiority of women such that they have been excluded from leadership in both society and the church.

In the seventh chapter Giles explains why he has chosen the terminology “hierarchical-complementarian” and “egalitarian-complementarian” to describe the two opposing views. He says, “As I cannot concede their case is traditional or historic and as I like to call myself a complementarian, I have decided to call those with whom I differ ‘hierarchical-complementarians’” (157). The term hierarchical, even though those it describes prefer not to use it, seems justified, claims Giles, since they frequently do use it in one of the seminal works representing the view, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, edited by John Piper and Wayne Grudem. Giles devotes the bulk of this chapter to supporting his contention that hierarchical-complementarians have a novel view since they do not agree with the historic view that teaches the inferiority of women, i.e., “the woman tradition.”

The next chapter, “Exegesis or Eisegesis?” asserts that hierarchical-complementarians are committed to a recently developed hermeneutical construct built by an elite group of men over the past thirty years. The three basic components of this construct are: “a novel understanding of what is meant by the expression the order of creation, a novel use of the word role and a novel and problematic meaning given to the word difference” (170). According to Giles, when these three components are brought to bear on a text of Scripture eisegesis inevitably follows. An attempt is made to illustrate numerous examples of eisegesis most of which come from Piper and Grudem’s Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood and Köstenberger, Schreiner and Baldwin’s Women in the Church (188-93).

The final chapter of part two offers an egalitarian-complementarian theological reading of the Bible. In Giles’s words, the Bible can be read “to endorse the full emancipation of women—indeed, I would say, to demand the full emancipation of women in our age and culture” (194). Confessing his own presuppositions Giles explains that he comes to the Bible much like Athanasius and Augustine did concerning the question of the Trinity and the eternal subordination of the Son. As they saw the danger in devaluing the Son through subordination so he wants to avoid the danger of subordinating women. In other words, in light of male-female equality, any reading of the Bible that devalues women must be categorically rejected. In addition, Giles’s life experiences have confirmed another presupposition—the rejection of male headship. He believes that “all the assertions of male headship by men are self-serving” (200).

Rather than surveying Giles’s egalitarian-complementarian treatment of key texts (203-08), the three hermeneutical principles that bring him to his conclusions are noted here:

Rule 1: The proper starting point in any discussion on the man-woman relationship is the starting point given in canonical revelation, Genesis 1:26-28. At the climax of the prologue to the whole Bible, we are told God made one species, humankind, differentiated not by roles but by their God-given nature . . . .

Rule 2: The Bible is always to be interpreted in line with its own primary forward-looking eschatological perspective. This means that God’s ideal for the man-woman relationship is to be seen not in the Garden of Eden, where the devil was present and sin was a possibility, but in the perfection of the new creation in Christ that will be consummated in the last day. This rule demands the rejection of normative orders-of-creation theology because in looking backwards it contradicts what is foundational to biblical theology.

Rule 3: From these two hermeneutical rules the most important rule follows: All texts that imply the equality of the sexes speak of God’s ultimate eschatological ideal; all texts that speak of the subordination of women are culturally limited, time-bound, practical advice to women living in a culture that took for granted the subordination of women. This means that all the exhortations to women to be subordinate do not apply in our age and culture (202-03).

In outlining this approach to reading the Bible, Giles is not simply suggesting a way of reading the Scriptures. Rather, he argues this is “how the Bible should be read in our age if we are to grasp its liberating moral and christocentric thrust.”
which affirms the equality of men and women (203).

Part Three: The Slavery Tradition: Rejected by All—Some in Ignorance

In part three, Giles attempts to show the significance of the biblical parallel between the subordination of women and the subordination of slaves. The Bible takes for granted both the subordination of women and slaves and does so in such a way as to never directly question their legitimacy because of the cultural context of the day. It could not have been otherwise. Thus, as in the women’s issue, some interpreters have wrongly argued that the Bible can be read to endorse a qualified form of subordination in the slave-owner relationship (216).

Chapter ten, “The Tradition,” surveys the history of biblical interpretation on slavery. “Until modern times, most Christians believed that the Bible regulated and legitimated slavery” (219). Among others, Giles claims that Chrysostom, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and many Puritans endorsed slavery. Even as late as 1957, Reformed theologian John Murray argues for the biblical institution of slavery (221). “The Rejection of the Proslavery Tradition” is the title of the next chapter. Here Giles explains that some contemporary evangelicals suggest that though the Bible does not legitimize slavery, it does regulate the abuse of slavery. Attempts to argue that the Bible only regulates slavery, however, miss the point. An entirely new hermeneutic—one that recognizes today’s cultural context as well as the failure to properly interpret the text for the first eighteen centuries of church history—is required (240-41).

The final chapter, “Lessons to be Learned & Concluding Thoughts,” suggests what is to be learned from the historical experience of the emancipation of slaves and women. The six lessons given are:

1. No social order should be taken as God-given and inviolable.
2. Culture is forever changing.
3. Theology divorced from social ethics is bound to be erroneous.
4. The Bible should not be read as though it were a set of timeless, transcultural precepts all saying virtually the same thing.
5. It is possible for evangelicals with the Bible in their hand to get the wrong answer from the Scriptures to the questions facing them in their age.
6. One must take great care not to undermine or deny explicitly or implicitly, the equal dignity, worth and potential of every human being (260-62).

Concluding the chapter, as well as recapitulating the book’s thesis, Giles identifies what he calls “the harmony line” that runs through the background of all three parts of the book (265). How to read the Bible theologically, the contribution of tradition as a theological source, and the culture’s effect on interpretation together form the harmony line that runs through the melody line of the Trinity, women’s subordination, and slavery.

Evaluation of Giles’s Work

Understanding the Issue

Giles speaks repeatedly about a “debate” over the doctrine of “the Trinity” (2, 5, 11, 14, 17, 25) when, in fact, this debate is emphatically not over the doctrine of the Trinity. The debate is actually over a more precise expression of trinitarian doctrine. His thesis is greatly hindered by this fundamental flaw. One might suggest that Giles simply means that this is a trinitarian discussion in that it touches on questions concerning the doctrine. However, Giles makes clear that he means more than this. His goal is to show the “orthodox” view of the doctrine of the Trinity, and in so doing, to prove that the eternal functional subordination of the Son falls outside of the boundaries of orthodoxy (25). But the question of whether or not the Son is temporarily or eternally subordinated to the Father is not a matter of trinitarian orthodoxy. Numerous scholars have shown this either explicitly or implicitly—whether in agreement with eternal subordination or not. There is room in trinitarian orthodoxy for both views. Those who argue for the eternal functional subordination of the Son do not claim that those rejecting it are outside of the boundaries of trinitarian orthodoxy. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Giles in his criticism of those who do affirm the eternal functional subordination of the Son.

Thesis and Theological Method

There are several weaknesses in Giles’s thesis and theological method. First, he builds his thesis on the relationship between tradition (as a theological source) and the concept of subordination rather than on the more important question one must ask regarding the concept of subordination—that is, what does the Bible teach about the concept of subordination? He intentionally neglects this question because of his hermeneutical commitments. But, in the end, evangelicals ought to agree that there is something intentionally good, by God’s design, about the biblical concept of one-way submission or subordination found in all three areas under discussion—trinitarian relations, male-female relations, and master-slave relations. The biblical emphasis on the value of one-way submission in relationships (seen, for example, in John’s Gospel on the Trinity, in Paul on male-female relations, and in Peter on master-slave relations) is completely obscured in Giles’s treatment. In other words, tradition properly understood as a theological source should
never obscure the clear teaching of a biblical concept.

Second, tradition as a source or contributor in theology has been invested with far too much hermeneutical value. For Giles, tradition means the way the Bible has been read or interpreted by the best theologians of church history (5). However, this is not a new concept. Theologians have long recognized four major sources for doing theology: Scripture, reason, tradition, and experience. But, affirming tradition as a theological or hermeneutical source does not necessarily require that there be a variety of valid readings of a text of Scripture. It is one thing to say that the history of interpretation assists in the pursuit of the proper interpretation of a text. It is quite another to say, as Giles does, that there are many valid interpretations of a particular text simply because church history evidences a variety of readings (9-10).

Third, the cultural context of the interpreter has been invested with far too much hermeneutical value. Giles is correct to point out the growing hermeneutical awareness among evangelicals regarding the two horizons of biblical interpretation, the horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter (10). However, this does not justify a variety of textual meanings or valid interpretations. Rather, an awareness of presuppositions (or of one’s own pre-understanding) is required in order to be critical of one’s own tendencies and biases when determining the biblical author’s intention.10 It is certainly helpful to recognize that cultural context has frequently hindered the interpretive process. However, the hermeneutical solution to this problem is not to exalt the hermeneutical source of cultural experience as does Giles, but rather, to refine the process through something similar to what Grant Osborne calls “the hermeneutical spiral,” which continually revisits the biblical text to determine the author’s intended meaning.11

Fourth, the most pressing question regarding Giles’s hermeneutical method is this: Who decides which cultural context determines the meaning of the text? Knowing someone will raise the obvious question regarding homosexuality as an additional test case for his method, Giles says, “Well what about homosexuality? Your position must mean the acceptance of homosexuality, since contemporary Western culture now accepts gays and lesbians” (269). He goes on to say that this criticism would be a fair one had he argued that culture should “determine” theology (269). But instead of arguing that culture is determinative, Giles claims that he only means that the impact of culture on the biblical writers and on all subsequent Christians must be considered in the hermeneutical and theological process. This qualification is anything but convincing. Giles has just argued for two-thirds of his book (parts two and three) that culture is determinative (cf. p. 203). He has clearly stated that there is not one correct interpretation of a biblical text. Ultimately then, the cultural experience of the interpreter is determinative in Giles’s hermeneutical method.

What else is the reader to conclude?

Finally, Giles’s hermeneutical rules on gender related texts require a response (202-03). His attempt to read Gen 1:26-28 (Rule 1) through an eschatological perspective which assumes that the ideal for the man-woman relationship was not the Garden of Eden before the Fall (Rule 2) runs counter to the general Pauline appeal to the pre-Fall Genesis account (see 1 Cor 11:2-16, Gal 3:28, Eph 5:21-33, Col 3:18-19, 1 Tim 2:8-15). In this way, then, Giles is inconsistent with his own proposal since he thinks it is significant to begin where “canonical revelation” begins (Rule 1). Köstenberger calls this hermeneutical mistake the fallacy of “underrating the importance of the use of the OT in the NT.” He says, Evangelical hermeneutics affirms the significance of authorial intention in determining meaning. If one seeks to understand the Pauline gender passages with regard to authorial intent, one must not take lightly the fact that Paul in virtually every instance refers to one or the other passage from Genesis 1-3.13

If Paul is looking backwards, as it were, to make a “canonical” case for his view of gender relations based on the creation order, then Giles’s particular expression of a forward-looking eschatological ideal has missed Paul’s intended meaning.

“Historic” or “Novel”

Another element of the author’s thesis deserves separate treatment because of related literature he has published. Giles’s thesis rests significantly on the claim that even complementarians have changed their theology of the sexes based on the cultural pressure of the modern women’s movement. Complementarians reject the ontological inferiority of women, contrary to Giles’s suggestion that exegetes of the last nineteen centuries have asserted that view. According to Giles, then, complementarians do not represent the “historic” view but have departed from tradition and actually have a “novel” view (143).

Giles originally made this argument in his two-part review article of Women in the Church: A Fresh Analysis of 1 Timothy 2:9-15, edited by Köstenberger, Schreiner, and Baldwin. In the article, as in the present publication, Giles claims that the contributors to Women in the Church do not line up closely enough with the historic position taken by previous commentators so as to be properly labeled “historic.” Köstenberger has responded in detail to Giles’s review. His response sufficiently calls into question Giles’s thesis in the present publication. In sum, Köstenberger lodges a twofold response. First, Giles’s charge is based on an exaggerated claim that is not made in the book. The contributors to Women in the Church
Church never suggest “their view aligns itself with various corollaries of a traditional interpretation, such as the affirmation of women’s ontological inferiority to men.”16 Whether or not the position is properly labeled “historic,” it is certainly closer to previous interpretations than an egalitarian approach to the text. Second, in the end the main concern is not about labels but rather “which position—egalitarian or non-egalitarian—more closely adheres to the scriptural message itself.”17 As Köstenberger suggests, perhaps Giles’s argument that complementarians have a “novel” view is a novelty itself.

Usage of Important Terms

There are at least three important categories of technical terms Giles uses repeatedly that fail to bring clarity to the discussion. The categories are: 1) evangelical and conservative evangelical; 2) subordination and subordinationism; 3) egalitarian-complementarian and hierarchical-complementarian.

In the first set of terms, “evangelical” and “conservative evangelical,” Giles uses the term conservative evangelical as a caricature for what he views as a minority of naïve, biblical literalists who do not have a well developed hermeneutic and are often guilty of proof-texting like the heretic Arius (3, 5-6, 10, 11, 53, 261, 264). Apparently this is wrapped up in the qualifier “conservative.” As for “evangelical,” Giles may think of himself as one, but apparently not in the sense that most self-identified evangelicals would understand the term.18 He says, “I confess, naturally, that the Bible is the Word of God, but this confession can mean different things to different people” (232, n. 73). Curiously, this statement is relegated to a footnote in which he further states that he does not equate “the words in the text with God’s words.” Following Donald Bloesch’s statement that “the Bible is not in and of itself the revelation of God but the divinely appointed means and channel of this revelation,” Giles makes clear that he does not hold an evangelical view of Scripture (n. 73). An evangelical view of Scripture is not to be equated with a neo-orthodox view of Scripture because evangelicals affirm that the text of Scripture is God’s revelation, not simply a vehicle for divine revelation.19

The second set of terms, “subordination and subordinationism,” are used frequently in the context of trinitarian discussion, and have a clearly defined usage. Theologians of the past have spoken in some sense of the trinitarian discussion, and have a clearly defined usage. “Subordination,” however, describes a heretical formulation of the doctrine of God, usually referred to as ontological subordinationism. Ontological subordinationism is recognized as heresy because it says the Son and Spirit do not share directly in the very being or essence of God the Father. The term subordinationism, then, is not used functionally (eternal or temporal) but rather ontologically (regarding being and essence only). This usage is well attested.20

Giles intentionally ignores the accepted distinction between these terms from the very first page of the book. Reflecting on his previous studies, he says, “from what I remembered of my undergraduate studies, the subordination of the Son had been deemed a heresy in the early church” (1). Giles does not say “subordinationism” was deemed a heresy as the title of the book suggests he should. Rather, he says the “subordination” of the Son was deemed a heresy. Instead of offering an objective assessment of the possibility of the doctrine of the eternal subordination of the Son, Giles ignores the very helpful categorical distinction made between subordination and subordinationism (22, 24, 26-28, 44, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60). Chapter three, “Subordinating Tradition,” contains several examples of how Giles’s dismissal of these accepted distinctions has negatively affected his reading of modern evangelical writings on the subject. Grudem, Kovach and Schenm, and Letham all affirm the ontological equality of the Son with the Father and in so doing reject the heresy of ontological subordinationism.21 Furthermore, those who like Dahms and the 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report argue for an ontological basis of the subordination of the Son (66, 79), yet another expression within the bounds of orthodoxy, also affirm the complete equality of being/essence of the Son even if it is expressed in a more Eastern (derived) sense.22 In short, most of the theologians cited in Giles’s third chapter have been unfairly represented, if not misrepresented.

The third set of terms requiring clarification is “egalitarian-complementarian” and “hierarchical-complementarian.” Giles intentionally avoids the generally accepted distinctions that accompany the terms egalitarian and complementarian. Since at least 1995, egalitarians Stanley J. Grenz and Denise Muir Kjesbo, among others, have been willing to identify the two main competing theologies of the sexes with these categories.23 Even though they recognize that some egalitarians question whether or not complementarity lies at the center of the opposing view, out of respect for those who hold the view, and who wish to identify it as such, they are willing to retain the designation. More recently, Two Views on Women in Ministry, edited by James R. Beck and Craig L. Blomberg, follows the generally accepted categories of egalitarian and complementarian, though not without qualification. The editors readily accept the term egalitarian but they are more hesitant about the term complementarian, suggesting that “hierarchical” is the more natural counterpart to “egalitarian.”24 Schreiner, however, writing as a representative of the complementarian view still prefers the term and even suggests that Blomberg, who prefers to be called neither hierarchicalist or egalitarian, “is still a complementarian, for he believes in role differences between the sexes.”25

It is understandable that both egalitarians and complementarians may want to qualify these labels. After all,
who on either side is comfortable with saying that one word perfectly summarizes their view? The solution, however, is not to link both views to the particular term complementarian which has been accepted as representing one of the views. This does not bring clarity to each view, only more confusion. Further, in what sense does “egalitarian” retain its distinctive meaning when attached to “complementarian”? Giles is free to use whatever language he wishes to describe his view. In the end, however, it would be best for him not to use the term complementarian since more than a decade of evangelical literature on the subject identifies complementarians as those who understand that role distinctions in masculinity and femininity are ordained by God as part of the created order.

**Trinitarian Concepts: Rahner’s Rule, the Filioque**

Two important trinitarian concepts that Giles uses inappropriately in part one are Rahner’s rule and the filioque clause.26 First, according to Giles, Rahner’s rule is misunderstood by theologians who argue for the eternal subordination of the Son. Giles cites Dahms, Grudem, Kovach and Schemm, Letham, and the 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report as examples of theologians who do not fully understand the significance of Rahner’s rule. As Giles puts it, these “seem to have heard of Rahner’s rule, but their understanding of what it teaches seems to be as mistaken as their understanding of historical theology” (29). Dahms, Letham, and the Moore College theologians all “think Rahner’s rule logically implies the eternal subordination of the Son” (29). Yet Dahms, Letham, and the 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report never even connect their argument to Rahner’s rule directly—not one of them.27 While they each speak in terms of the relationship between the economic and the immanent Trinity they never do so on the basis of Rahner’s axiom, nor do they even refer to Rahner. Is one to conclude that every reference to the economic/immanent Trinity is a reference to Rahner’s axiom?

Compounding the problem, Giles claims “Grudem fast concludes that Rahner’s rule teaches that in the Trinity there is ‘ontological equality but economic subordination’—exactly the opposite of what Rahner is arguing!” (30). Again, checking the reference, one finds that there is no mention of Rahner or his axiom in the context of Grudem’s argument. Kovach and Schemm are said to “audaciously claim that Grudem’s conclusion ‘captures the foundational notion’ behind the contemporary understanding” of ontological equality and economic subordination (30). In fact, the quote from Kovach and Schemm on capturing the foundational notion of ontological equality and economic subordination refers not to Grudem, but rather, to Gregory of Nazianzus. Additionally, the note in which Grudem is mentioned in this context makes clear that “Grudem does not make this connection to Gregory.”28 The phrase “ontological equality and economic subordination” is cited from Grudem simply as a reference to a possible modern expression of Gregory’s thought. Mistakes like these cast a shadow of doubt over the rest of Giles’s work.

Second, the filioque clause is significant because of statements Giles makes about an Eastern view of the doctrine of the Trinity. He suggests that acceptance of the filioque is required in order to guarantee the unity of being (and thus equality) among the members of the Godhead. As Giles puts it, the filioque addition “safeguards the vital truth established in the Nicene Creed that the Father and the Son are one in being/substance, and it disallows any disjunction between the Son and the Spirit that would be contrary to Scripture” (50)—as if Eastern views never attempted or succeeded in guarding the unity of being based on the monarchê of the Father.29 Further, Giles says, “In contrast to the Eastern church, the Western church has always been more concerned about the danger of subordination implied by making both the Son and the Spirit dependent on the Father than it has been concerned about maintaining the monarchê of the Father” (50). Aside from such sweeping generalizations and lack of historical precision, Giles’s statements end up relegating all who reject the filioque to the slippery slope of ontological subordinationism—as if the Cappadocians, and even Athanasius, were not protecting the monarchê of the Father (see the discussion below on Athanasius and the Cappadocians). Apparently, for Giles there is little room in trinitarian orthodoxy for those who reject the filioque clause.

**Theologians on the Eternal Subordination of the Son**

Space does not permit commenting on every theologian that Giles uses to argue against the doctrine of the eternal subordination of the Son. However, what follows should be sufficient evidence to call the reader to a more thorough investigation of the theologians Giles uses to make his case. Several such concerns regarding Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Calvin are introduced here.

Athanasius is the most important theologian in this discussion not only because of his understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son but also because Giles claims to be following his lead hermeneutically. As far as interpretive method goes, Giles repeatedly claims to be following Athanasius’s “scope” (Gk. skopos) of Scripture (3-4, 8, 35-37, 46). By scope of Scripture, Giles understands Athanasius to mean “the overall drift of the Bible, its primary focus, its theological center” (3). In as much as Giles presents the scope of Scripture as the proper way to view the incarnation of the Word for the purpose of human salvation, he is correct.30 However, Giles’s use of Athanasius’s concept of the scope of Scripture is problematic in at least two ways.

First, Athanasius’s concept is not so much a hermeneutical method that distinguishes the incarnational nature of the Son from the ontological nature of the Son, as Giles suggests, as much as it is a hermeneutic that unites the
incarnational nature with the ontological—or better, that
grounds the incarnational nature in the being of God for the
purpose of human salvation. Thus it does not necessarily
follow that Athanasius categorically rejects the eternal
functional subordination of the Son. It is arguable that
Athanasius envisages an eternal order in the Godhead that
harmonizes well with the concept of eternal subordination. Additionally, it is important to recognize that Athanasius’s
understanding of the Father as “unoriginate” and “uncaused” in
the divine being suggests an eternal irreversible order in the
Trinity. 

Second, Giles overstates the contrast between
Athanasius’s theological method (scope of Scripture) and
Arius’s proof-text method. While Arius ends up in the wrong
place, it is not so much due to making the Bible mean whatever
the “clever theologian” wants it to mean (3)—the point being
that those who disagree with Giles over the subordination of
the Son do the same thing. Rather, Arius, like Athanasius has
significant theological presuppositions driving his
interpretation of the text. Arius starts theologically in the wrong
place. One does not get this sense from Giles and thus the
reality of the textual battle over Nicene orthodoxy has not been
presented accurately. There is much more to say about Patristic
exegesis both before, during, and after Nicea, but suffice it to
say that the parallels between Arian heretics and those arguing
for the eternal functional subordination of the Son may not be
quite as obvious to others as to Giles.

The Cappadocian fathers wanted to exclude ontological
subordinationism, but according to Giles, were not completely
successful because of their prior commitment to the Father as
the single source of deity (43). Yet their expression does not
fall outside of the boundaries of trinitarian orthodoxy. In fact,
some would suggest that seeing the Father as the fount of deity
is not so easily demonstrated that Calvin rejects a
subordination to the Father is equally questionable. Giles is
particularly insightful. First, he makes clear that there is an
acceptable degree of subordination (he even says “-ism”) in
orthodox trinitarian thought, particularly for those who see the
Father as the fount of deity in the Godhead. Second, he
suggests that there is also room in orthodoxy for a sense of
subordination that is grounded in the being of God and yet does
not lapse into a heretical form of “ontological
subordinationism” (my words) where there is a diminution of
the divine being of the Son. Giles simply does not present the
Cappadocians, or a more Eastern approach, in a balanced way.
Perhaps, then, his statement that the Cappadocians so opposed
any form of ontological and functional subordinationism that it
“cannot be questioned” ought itself to be questioned (67).

To use Calvin to argue against any sense of the Son’s
subordination to the Father is equally questionable. Giles is
correct to point out that Calvin rejects subordinationism to a
degree that would lessen the deity of the Son (58). However, it
is not so easily demonstrated that Calvin rejects a
subordination or relational order among the persons of the
Trinity. The opposite appears to be the case. For example,
Calvin calls the Father the “first in order,” and identifies him as
“the beginning and fountainhead of the whole divinity.”

Again he says, “we admit that in respect to order and degree
the beginning of divinity is in the Father.” Calvin explains
that the distinctions of the persons carry peculiar qualities such
that there is an irreversible order among them. The three
persons share in the same essence and yet a reasoned order is
kept among them—such an order, however, does not take away
from the deity of the Son and Spirit.

Hodge understood Calvin to teach that in some sense the
Son is subordinate to the Father. After citing a lengthy section
of Calvin, Hodge summarizes, “We have here the three
essential facts involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, namely,
unity of essence, distinction of persons, and subordination
without any attempt at explanation.” Robert L. Reymond,
who goes to great lengths to explain exactly what it is he thinks
Calvin means by the eternal generation of the Son, is more
careful than Giles in his assessment of Calvin’s view of the
Son’s subordination. He says, Calvin contends against all subordination with respect to the Son’s “divine essence.”43 Concluding his treatment of the generation of the Son, Reymond explains that he is in agreement with Calvin’s view that the Father precedes the Son by reason of order—however, going beyond what “order” means he cannot say. Like Calvin, however, he is sure about rejecting ontological subordinationism—“there is no essential subordination of the Son to the Father within the Godhead.”44

A Trinitarian Model for Gender Roles

Giles believes that those who affirm the eternal subordination of the Son do so on the basis of an all-consuming drive for male headship (115). The root cause of their heretical subordinationism is that they begin with fallen human relations and, by way of analogy, work back to divine relations. This model, says Giles, moves in the wrong direction reading back into the Trinity prior beliefs about the sexes (109-110). Giles offers three strands of evidence that supposedly indicate this analogical movement from the human to the divine. However, he never explains what this analogical process is, nor what an analogy incorporating humanity’s fallen relations could possibly say about divine relations. The reason is, simply, because those who affirm the eternal subordination of the Son are not guilty of what Giles claims.

For example, Wayne Grudem does not argue from the human to the divine. Rather, he makes clear that based on the image of God humanity reflects unity and diversity in relationships.45 Robert Letham is certainly not suggesting a move from the human to the divine analogically. In fact, he argues just the opposite. Male headship is not only compatible with human relations that reflect the divine image but also is grounded in the very being of God.46 Finally, the 1999 Sydney Doctrine Report does not claim to move analogically from the human to the divine. Instead, it makes clear that certain “biblical controls of the procedure” are required in order to make such a connection between the human and the divine—one such control is the textual evidence of Gen 1:27 which makes clear that the relationship between the sexes somehow reflects the intra-trinitarian relations of God (135). Thus Giles has gone to great lengths to oppose a trinitarian model for gender relations that, in fact, does not exist.

Giles suggests a pattern for social and gender relations that is found in the intra-trinitarian relations of the Godhead. He follows Erickson’s proposal for “mutual submission” among the members of the Trinity (103).46 Giles sees this pattern in both church and home as one of symmetry, mutuality, and community, leaving little room for any sense of asymmetry, one-way submission, and authority (105). But, two weaknesses of this approach are as follows. First, the concept of mutual submission is problematic both on the human and the divine level. Regarding the divine level,47 one may ask in what way does the Father submit to the Spirit or to the Son? Giles cites Pannenberg’s emphasis on the mutual dependence of the Father, Son, and Spirit as evidence of how the Father subordinates himself to the Son (96). Pannenberg, however, does not speak in the language of mutual “submission” or “subordination,” but rather of “mutuality” and “dependence” and is quite careful to protect the relational priority of the Father.48 There is a considerable difference between the intra-trinitarian idea of dependence and reciprocity, seen for example in the concept of perichoresis, and the idea of mutual submission. Nowhere does Scripture evidence such an idea that the Father “submits” himself to the Son or the Spirit. Second, a trinitarian pattern for social and gender relations that completely removes the relational priority of the Father must explain why it is that he is still called “Father.” As Bruce Ware has shown, this is a particularly difficult position for egalitarians since they affirm the predominance of masculine biblical references to God and yet deny the unique significance of that language in terms of “authority.”49 What exactly does the name “Father” signify in the Godhead if not relational priority and relational authority?

Some Other Concerns

There are other concerns that ought to be addressed as well. Some of them are theological in nature while others are more rhetorical. Theologically: 1) It would be interesting to know how Giles handles the eternal generation of the Son in light of his thesis regarding the subordination of the Son; 2) Does an emphasis on the unity of being and action in the Godhead (on which Giles bases his argument), of necessity, oppose the distinct roles appropriate to each divine person (appropriations)? 3) Is there no sense in which one can speak biblically about the irreversible roles of Father, Son, and Spirit in the Trinity? 4) Is it impossible to harmonize the concept of perichoresis with the eternal functional subordination of the Son? 5) To what degree should Giles have interacted with the Spirit in light of his thesis regarding subordination? Rhetorically: 1) Why does Giles argue his case with such inflammatory language? 2) Why does he speak of the “permanent subordination of women” when most complementarians would reject such language? 3) To what end does Giles identify complementarians with Arians, or oppressors of women’s rights, or cruel slave owners?

Conclusion: On the Son’s Subordination

Giles claims that in order to maintain an orthodox view of the doctrine of the Trinity one must reject the possibility of the eternal functional subordination of the Son to the Father. He argues that the history of trinitarian doctrinal development affirms his view. Further, he suggests that all modern trinitarian expressions that harmonize with the Nicene tradition reject the possibility of the eternal subordination of the Son, whether in
being or in function. The primary purpose of this article, however, has been to show that Giles often overstates his case and in some instances simply misrepresents the facts. The question of the eternal subordination of the Son is not a question of trinitarian orthodoxy. Further, the evidence given ought to encourage readers to investigate more thoroughly the way Giles represents each theologian he uses to present his claims. Apparently, this reviewer sees the boundaries of trinitarian orthodoxy as a bit wider than does Giles—something for which traditionalists are not normally known. In the end, Giles’s intention to expose the “heresy” of the eternal functional subordination of the Son has not been successful.

1 Kevin Giles, The Trinity & Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God & the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002).
3 Ibid.
4 The official title of the Sydney report is, The 1999 Sydney Anglican Diocesan Doctrine Commission Report: “The Doctrine of Trinity and Its Bearing on the Relationship of Men and Women.” Giles has included the report in its entirety as his Appendix B.
5 That Giles does not understand the “debate” as a more precise expression of trinitarian doctrine is seen in these words, “Those on one side of this doctrinal dispute point to texts that subordinate the Son to the Father, and those on the other point to texts that speak of the oneness or equality of the Father and the Son” (25). This is simply not the case. Those who argue for the eternal functional subordination of the Son consistently attempt to explain this doctrine in light of the full equality and oneness of the three persons—this is the very point of “trinitarian” doctrine.
6 The “eternal functional subordination” of the Son is to be distinguished from the “eternal subordination” of the Son. Without the qualifier “functional,” it is possible, though not correct, to read the word “eternal” as synonymous with “ontological.” I prefer the phrase “eternal functional subordination” because it makes clear that the Son’s subordination is not “ontological subordination.” See n. 20.
8 I am unaware of any evangelical who affirms the eternal subordination of the Son and in so doing also declares that those who do not support the same view are outside of the boundaries of trinitarian orthodoxy. The purpose of Kovach and Schemm’s article, for example, was to defend the view in light of an apparently revisionist reading of the history of the doctrine, not to argue that “functional” subordination is outside of the boundaries of orthodoxy. See Stephen D. Kovach and Peter R. Schemm, Jr., “A Defense of the Doctrine of the Eternal Subordination of the Son,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 42/3 (September 1999) 461-76.
13 Ibid., 268.
16 Köstenberger, “Women in the Church: A Response to Kevin Giles,” 216.
17 Ibid., 206.
18 Members of the Evangelical Theological Society must affirm the following statement about the Bible: “The Bible alone and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs.” See the inside cover of any issue of the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society.
25 Thomas R. Schreiner, “Review of Two Views on Women in...

27 I am here depending on Giles’s references, which, when checked show that those cited are simply discussing the concepts of the economic and immanent Trinity. They make no effort to interpret or even to refer to Rahner’s axiom.

28 Kovach and Schemm, 467, n. 45.


31 Ibid., 342, 351.

32 See Kovach and Schemm, 466-67.


37 Ibid., 1.13.24.

38 Ibid., 1.13.20.


41 Ibid., 335.

42 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 256.

43 Letham, 73-74.


45 Wayne Grudem offers sufficient evidence to call into question the legitimacy of the concept of mutual submission on the human level, between husband and wife. See Wayne Grudem, “The Myth of ‘Mutual Submission,’” CBMW News 1/4 (October 1996) 1, 3-4.


47 Bruce A. Ware, “Tampering with the Trinity: Does the Son Submit to His Father?” Journal for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood 6/1 (Spring 2001) 8.